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Abstract 
People’s attachment to a subsidy creates difficulties for the government to phase out, and 
eventually eliminate, the subsidy. Elimination of fuel subsidy scheme in Indonesia is a perfect 
example of such occurrence. The subsidy has been implementing to commodity as opposed to 
households, thus individuals may not necessarily realized that they have been enjoying the 
subsidy when they buy fuel. In this case people may feel as if they are endowed by the values 
from the provision of the policy. The elimination of the subsidy consequently may be perceived 
as a loss - as opposed to a foregone gain.  
This study aims to obtain the most acceptable exit strategy to eliminate the subsidy from the 
perspective of households by conducting a laboratory-based survey. The alternative exit 
strategies include methods of elimination of the subsidy and of reallocation of resources saved 
from eliminating the subsidy. The policy options have been derived using insight from 
behavioral economics ranging from endowment effect, status quo bias, to present biasness.  
The survey includes 335 subjects, who come from four different backgrounds: 1) households 
with no motor vehicle; 2) households with only motorcycle(s); (3) households with one car and; 
4) households with one luxurious car or more than one car. Each subject faces 55 paired-wise 
policy alternatives and the method proposed by Dunn-Rankin (1983) has been used to derive the 
ordering of preferences. 
The result shows that gradual elimination of fuel subsidy and reallocation to earmarked programs 
were the most acceptable policy elements of the exit strategy. The survey, indirectly, showed that 
subjects’ valuation of losses is greater for direct elimination strategies than that of the equivalent 
gradual elimination strategies. The results also show that respondents chose “to pay” later at a 
smaller amount than “to pay” immediately of the equivalent total value. The reallocation of 
resources saved to earmarked programs is more acceptable than the reallocation to non-
earmarked programs. In particular, respondents opted for a more immediate compensation from 
the elimination or reduction of the subsidy.   
Key Word: Fuel subsidy, experimental economics, laboratory-based survey, paired comparison, 
preference relation, reallocation of resources.  
JEL Classifications: C91, D03, D12, Q48 
1.	  INTRODUCTION	  
Most governments, in general, face difficulties of eliminating or phasing out policies—
especially those, which provide transfer payment to households—owing to people’s 
attachment to the policy. Individuals’ valuation of the policy include not only to the extent of 
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explicit value of the policy their entitlement to the policy and how long have they been 
benefited from the policy. Any attempt to eliminate or phase out the subsidy, therefore, will 
be perceived by households as a loss. Demonstrations occurred in Nigeria and Indonesia, as a 
reaction of the governments’ plans to cut fuel subsidy, provide perfect examples on the 
complexity of eliminating or phasing out the policy.  
Standard economic analysis does not provide sufficient analytical explanation on why people 
have a strong view when the subsidy that they have received will be eliminated or phased out. 
The analysis does not suggest that individuals weigh losses much more than gains, therefore 
individuals’ attachment on the subsidy and their over reaction against the policy to reduce the 
subsidy, for instance, should not be as strong as what were occurred in Indonesia, Nigeria and 
India.  
Behavioral economics may provide explanation on the overreaction of individuals’ attitude 
toward the policy to reduce fuel subsidy in those countries. There are overwhelming 
evidences that individuals tend to weigh losses much larger than the respective gains 
(Markowitz, 1959, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1991, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, 
Rabin, 2000, inter alia). Individuals’ evaluation toward the goods that they possessed tends to 
be higher than their valuation toward the goods before they possess them and, as a result, 
individuals’ willingness to pay is different from their willingness to accept (Knetsch, 1994, 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990). Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) found similar 
evidence and they called the phenomenon as status quo bias.  
In term of intertemporal decision-making process, individuals suffer from the lack of self 
control or present biased preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; 2001). 
Furthermore, individuals are not good in making future plans (Bone, Hey and Suckling, 2003, 
2009, Hey, 2004, Hey and Knoll, 2009).  
People tend to perceive foregone gain to be more acceptable than losses. Thaler and Benartzi 
(2008) used behavioral economics as insights to formulate “prescription” for employees’ 
savings problem. Their proposed program, Save More Tomorrow (SMarT), attempt to induce 
employees to join the program by framing saving as a forgone gain as opposed to a loss.2 In 
the program, an increase in employees’ saving occurred due to a change of saving concept 
from taking part of current take-home pay to foregoing a part of future increase in their 
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salary. The program was successful since it took into account individuals’ behavior toward 
gains and losses.  
Fuel subsidy scheme in Indonesia has been implemented for decades owing to the fact that as 
an oil producer people are entitled to benefit from what was “endowed” to them. Fuel subsidy 
scheme, politically, can be easily framed as a good policy.  Owing to the idea that people feel 
as if being endowed, people do not realize that they are buying fuel at subsidized price, 
nevertheless people feel as if they are paying the real price.  
The fuel subsidy scheme is inefficient with the fact that the rich consume more subsidized 
fuel than the poor.3 The Government of Indonesia alternatively can use the fund for strategic 
development and poverty alleviation program. The Government of Indonesia (GoI) had 
planned to remove fuel subsidy, although the plan did not materialize, owing to political 
pressures toward the policy.  
Normative theories, derived by solving particular optimization problem (Raiffa, 1982; Thaler 
and Benartzi, 2008), may not be sufficient to opt for one specific policy as a result in giving 
up the fuel subsidy. This study aims to seek the most acceptable policy option regarding the 
elimination of fuel subsidy in Indonesia using behavioral economics insights. In particular, 
the design of the study reflects individuals’, with different characteristics, responses to losses 
and endowment effect. We aim to obtain a set of policy options regarding the elimination of 
fuel subsidy that are most acceptable by the households.  
This article first highlights the formulation of policy options using behavioral insights. A 
short description on the fuel subsidy in Indonesia will be discussed in section 2. Section 3 
discusses the application of paired comparison method to assess households’ acceptability to 
the alternative policy options. Finally, the results of laboratory-based survey regarding the 
most acceptable policy in eliminating the fuel subsidy in Indonesia is discussed in section 4.  
2.	  COMMUNITY	  PREFERENCE-­‐BASED	  STRATEGY	  
It is essential to assess community preferences regarding a policy to eliminate fuel subsidy, as 
the preferences would reflect the values that individuals assigned. In general, individuals tend 
to perceive the elimination of fuel subsidy as a loss. Each individual, however, is going to 
have different attitude toward the elimination of fuel subsidy. Similarly, individuals may have 
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different attitude when they face negative prospects. These differences in attitude result in 
different economic and heuristic valuation toward the policy.  
Households’ behavior in reality may not necessarily follow closely the optimal plan proposed 
by permanent-income hypothesis in the account of two arguments (Thaler and Benartzi, 
2004).4 First, households might fail to compute the actual losses that they bear owing to the 
policy. Second, even if households knew the actual losses, they might be lacking of self-
control to reduce current consumption for future consumption (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981, 
Shea, 1995). Moreover, households might find it difficult to integrate intertemporal choice 
prospect into their existing plan (Frederick et al., 2002).   
The insights of time preference, particularly of gains and losses, and endowment effect also 
have important implications to the formulation of the policy options.5 Most individuals tend 
to procrastinate (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2000) owing to time inconsistency leading to 
subjective valuation of a prospect with the same value is higher at an earlier date over a later 
date. Individuals also tend to impose smaller discount rates for losses than those of for gains 
(Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1987). Individual valuation of a goods ties closely with his or 
her entitlement to that goods. In particular, valuation of the goods is higher when the goods 
belong to the individual (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990, Knetsch, 1994, Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser, 1988). This idea is in line with the Prospect Theory, which stated losses are 
weighed more heavily than respective gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1991, 1992).  
One important insight regarding the endowment effect is that households, in general, do not 
feel that they are being subsidized when purchasing the subsidized fuel. Most households do 
not actually know and observe the gains that they have received from the fuel subsidy. 
Households feel as if that they have been endowed with the subsidy, intensifying people’s 
attachment to the policy. Removal of the subsidy therefore would not be regarded as a 
foregone gain but rather as a loss.6 As Idson et al. (1999) stated, the intensity of people’s 
reactions to a loss is greater than a non-gain.  
                                                      
4 See Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957) for discussion of permanent-income hypothesis 
5 See Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Warner and Pleeter (2001), and Hausman (1979) used insights regarding time 
preference to formulate policies.  
6 Individuals may also face negative outcomes not only to the extent of removal of the subsidy but also 
possibility of increase in general prices of goods and services.  
5 
 
In relation to the elimination of the subsidy, the main challenge of the policy would be in the 
assessment of economic value of a particular reform since such assessment is important to 
ensure optimal allocation of resources. In the case of environment losses valuation, 
Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade (1999) suggested that there are limited methods to estimate 
monetary values as well as limited agreement regarding consistency of the valuations. They 
found that individuals faced complexity in performing monetary valuations. This finding was 
supported by Rutherford et al. (1998) who reported that people found difficulty in providing 
consistent monetary measures.  
The alternative strategy to overcome the problem above is to construct ranking of the relative 
importance using people’s judgments. Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein (1998) found 
consistency in individuals’ assessment of relative values. The concept of relative value in this 
study follow closely Brown’s (1984) concept that is “value is the expressed relative 
importance of worth of an object to an individual or group in a given context”. Such value 
provides relative importance of the choices using implicit or explicit comparison (Brown, 
1984). The scale of relative importance is essential in the formulation policy to optimize 
resource allocation. The values attained from this exercise would reflect people’s choices, 
which were socially acceptable (Chuenpagdee, 1998). 
The advantage of the use of ordering choices is that irrespective of the background of 
households, subjects would perform a less daunting and a less difficult task in providing 
ranking of the choices (Chuenpagdee, 1998).7 As a result, households may be able to stipulate 
a consistent ranking of alternatives. The use of ordering of choices is sufficient to be used in a 
study provided that the study focuses on the ordering of the alternatives (Arrow, 1951). It 
should be noted that the households may face incommensurable options during the process. 
Chuenpagdee (1998) exerted that reasonable choices and ordinal ranking are feasible even if 
options are incommensurable. 
In this study, households’ preferences regarding the elimination of fuel subsidy were derived 
using choices of relative values. These choices, established in a range of policy options, were 
formulated and tested to subjects who would be affected by the policy. The study aims to 
observe whether a particular policy option of eliminating fuel subsidy is more acceptable than 
the others. Each policy question consisted of two policy elements which were methods of 
phasing out the subsidy and methods of reallocating the resources due to the policy.  
                                                      
7 Such strategy is also used in the valuation of environmental losses where monetary valuation is imperfect. 
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Considering various behavioral factors which may attributable to households’ decisions, we 
set up two methods of phasing out the subsidy: straight elimination and gradual elimination. 
Indeed, from the perspective of households, the elimination of fuel subsidy is considered as a 
loss, thus it is interesting to observe whether individuals choose to cope with the scheme at 
earlier date or later. A straight elimination will be regarded as a higher decrease in current 
income relative to a gradual elimination. This notion would be more relevant to households 
with relatively high consumption of subsidized fuel both nominally or proportionally to their 
expenditure plan. This type of households may well carefully calculate the effect of both 
prospects to their consumption.  In contrast, households who do not consume subsidized fuels 
may feel indifferent between the two prospects of subsidy elimination. 
Each policy option was composed by incorporating methods of reallocating resources of  fuel 
subsidy. There were two broader schemes of reallocation which are earmarking or dedicated 
funds and general or unstipulated funds. These schemes reflect two different agents, namely, 
the GoI and the households, who may have different utility functions. In general, their utility 
functions may be conflicting from one to another. What the GoI perceive as the first best 
option of reallocating the fuel subsidy fund may not necessarily  perceived as the best option 
by the households.  
The GoI may focus on maximising the social welfare function of the society not only for the 
short run but also for the long run given certain budget constraint. The GoI will allocate its 
budget to wide-range government’s programs, however, each program may not necessarily be 
targeted to a particular or a group of households as the program seek optimal allocation of 
available resources. On the other hands,  households tend to maximise their own utility 
functions, and they may not necessarily consider neither other households’ utility function 
nor future generations’ utility function.  At this point, the GoI and the households may have 
different utility functions, and to some extend their utility function may also conflicting from 
one to the other. Consequently, what the GoI perceive as the best option to eliminate the fuel 
subsidy and to realocate the fuel subsidy fund may not necessarily be perceived as the best 
option by the households.  
Consider a case in which two types of household, the first type receives the benefit of subsidy 
whereas the second type does not receive the benefit of subsidy. Dedicated funds or 
earmarking allow households of the first type to observe the goods or cash as a compensation 
of the eliminated subsidy. Lets we assume that elimination of subsidy implies that households 
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are making payments. Earmarking would be more preferable for households as they seem 
more like getting something for the payment, analogous to a transaction in the market. 
Unstipulated funds or general program, on the other hand, implies that households may not 
directly receive anything for their payment. As a result, households receiving fuel subsidy 
would consider such scheme to result in a loss as opposed to a transaction. Households of the 
second type may consider earmarked programs as a gain rather than a compensation for their 
payment. Moreover, these households may be indifferent to reallocation to general program.  
Households may also face uncertainty from reallocation to general program. Caplin and 
Leahy (2001), who incorporated expected utility function anticipatory emotions driven by 
uncertainty about the future, suggested that such emotion lead to time inconsistency. 
Empirical studies, such as that of Gideon Karen and Peter Roelofsma (1995) and Albrecht 
and Weber (1996) showed that uncertainty to current and future rewards influence individuals 
valuation (Frederick et al., 2002).  
In this study, child vaccination and mass rapid transportation (MRT) were two earmarked 
programs which would be used to reallocate the eliminated subsidy. There are several 
rationale for choosing child vaccination as one of earmarked programs in the experiment. 
First, child vaccination is a straightforward arbitrary example of direct reallocation program 
for households. Every households need vaccination program, provided that each of them are 
endowed with child(ren). Second, child vaccination program has a widespread coverage. 
Every households, with different income background, are able to receive the benefit from 
vaccination program. The poor and low-income households have an equal opportunity to 
receive the benefit of child vaccination program as the high-income households. Third, even 
though child vaccination provides immediate reward, households cannot experience the 
benefit immediately. The benefit of vaccination, that is prevention of diseases, mortality, or 
disability for a single child, cannot be valued directly into monetary unit.  
The other policy choice proposes earmarked reallocation of fuel subsidy saved to 
development of mass rapid transportation (MRT). The MRT would provide benefit to the 
household irrespective of their income background. Establishment of MRT would serve as 
the optimum alternative to private vehicle usage. The most apparent difference is that the 
coverage of MRT is not as vast since the MRT would be built only in several cities and 
districts. Each household would also value the MRT differently. For example, households 
who commute in workdays would value the project higher than those whose activities are 
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home-based, such as home industry owner. Additionally, the execution of the MRT 
development would not be as swift as that of the vaccine thus households may not view the 
reallocation as immediate reward.  
One of the policy choices offered in this experiment also include reallocation for repayment 
of foreign debt including its interest. On the contrary to the vaccination and MRT 
development program, repayment of foreign debt is an indirect reallocation program. 
Households would not receive immediate benefit if the subsidy fund were reallocated to 
repay the debt. Therefore, the decision to choose such alternative would be considered as 
intergenerational decision making process.8 
The last policy option is reallocation of the fuel subsidy fund to general or various 
government programs. In this scheme, indeed, households would not be able to observe the 
types of benefit they would receive. Households confront state of the world as households do 
not observe the type of reallocation and timing of the disbursement of the rellocation. Unlike 
the other three alternatives, households would find this alternative difficult to internalize into 
their utility function owing to uncertainty. Furthermore, households’ decision to vote for this 
alternative may depends on their valuation of the government i.e. the institution that would 
actually formulate and execute the reallocation program.  
These policy options were going to be tested to several groups of households. These groups 
are divided according to possession of vehicle since the type of vehicle will determine the 
amount of subsidized fuel consumed. The first group includes households who posses neither 
motorcycle or car. The second and third group includes households who posses motorcycle 
and one car respectively. The last group include those who posses more than one car. 
It is interesting to observe the responses from two very different types of households, 
particularly the responses to losses. Loss aversion, which is valuation of losses greater than 
gains, suggest that a loss of $X is greater than a gain of $X (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (2008) stated that people value losses greater than gains as 
shown in many experiments such as Knetsch and Sinden (1984), Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1990). Households with no vehicle may not necessarily perceive elimination of fuel 
subsidy as a loss since they do not actually consume subsidized fuel directly. On the other 
hand, households who own motorcycle(s) and car(s) are going to experience losses since they 
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consume the subsidized fuel on a routine basis. This group of households may already have 
internalized the subsidy into their daily expenditure plan. On the extreme, households in this 
group might not realize that they have been being subsidized. Therefore, there is a possibility 
that this group will give a greater response to these losses relative to the other group of 
households.  
3.	  DERIVING	  SCALES	  OF	  RELATIVE	  IMPORTANCE	  
Households would find difficulties in assessing policy options discussed in the previous 
section using monetary valuation. Households, in this study, assessed only to the extent of 
their ranking of preferences. A method than can be applied to extract households’ preferences 
is paired comparison survey. Paired comparison survey is a conventional psychometric 
method for ordering preferences among objects of interest (David, 1988; Chuenpagdee et al., 
2001). The output of the method is ordering of preferences among stated alternative (David, 
1988). He also stated that method is useful when there are relative large numbers of options 
to be compared. Peterson and Brown (1998) showed that the method is applicable in the 
valuation of public goods and provides high degree of transparency.  
Policy options were arranged in pairs so that each option is compared with every other one. 
Using the method of combination, the total number of pairs for comparisons is N = nC2 = n(n 
– 1)/2, where N is the total number of pairs and n  is the number of policy options. Assuming 
there are four objects of interest, a, b, c, and d, the six possible paired comparisons are: (a vs. 
b), (a vs. c), (a vs. d), (b vs. c), (b vs. d), and (c vs. d). Respondents, for each pair, may state a 
more acceptable option with a scale of one to three. Harker and Vargas (1987) suggested that 
such scale is utilized for ratio judgments. Furthermore, respondents may also state that they 
are indifferent between the paired options. 
There are several procedures that can be applied to recap respondents’ preferences among the 
pairs. One procedure is analytical hierarchy process (AHP) which produces a ratio scale. The 
rankings of alternatives, however, are arbitrary (Dyer, 1990).9 AHP requires subjective 
estimate of strength, which is essentially difficult (Dyer, 1990). Owing to this difficulty, the 
preference theory based on the concept of strength preference is not preferable (Fishburn, 
1988; Farquhar and Keller, 1988).  
                                                      
9 Results of the survey summarized using AHP are shown in Pradiptyo and Sahadewo (2012). 
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One alternative method to derive the preference scores is to report the proportion of times a 
policy option is chosen. These scores are utilized to formulate the scale of relative importance 
using the variance stable rank sum method by Dunn-Rankin (1983). In particular, these 
scores are normalized to a scale from 0 to 100 by dividing the proportion of times that the 
policy option is chosen relative to the maximum number of times it is possible to be chosen 
by all respondents (Dunn-Rankin, 1983). The normalized scores are the scale of relative 
importance of the policy options. Non-parametric approaches, in particular, Gamma 
coefficient and Kendall coefficient of agreement, are applicable to test the rankings and the 
scale values.10  
Our survey design accommodates individuals who are indifferent between two choices where 
Dunn-Rankin method assume individuals are decisive between the two choices. The 
preference scores derived from our survey data, therefore, eliminate those who are indifferent 
between the two choices. Consequently, the average preference scores for all choices are not 
going to converge to the theoretical value.11 The application of the scale still remains as the 
caveat of our study.  
4.	  LABORATORY-­‐BASED	  SURVEY	  AND	  RESULTS	  
In this study, a laboratory-based survey has been used to explore the most acceptable strategy 
perceived by households in eliminating fuel subsidy. Four groups of sample households, 
comprising of 335 subjects, participated in the survey in computer laboratories of the Faculty 
of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. Although the data 
collection stage was conducted in a computer laboratory and subjects faced pair wise choices 
in their PCs, the nature of the exercise tend to be a survey as oppose to an experiment. The 
survey would have been difficult to be conducted using conventional interviews or 
questionnaire since the subjects have to face 55 pair-wise questions. The use of computer 
laboratory ensures that the subjects better engaged in choosing pair-wise policy options.   
Respondents were defined as those who live or work within 5 km radius from Faculty of 
Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada. Field assistants spread words and 
brochures to call for participations from university and faculties’ employees and also to 
households whithin the sampling area. Call for participations were also published through 
emails and internet through experimenters’ website. Individuals can either sign up  to be 
                                                      
10 Gamma coefficient is suitable for data with tied observations (Goodman and Kruskal, 1963).   
11 The average preference score for all choices is 50%.  
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included in the pool of subjects in paper or through the available web form. Individuals read 
and signed the informed consent at registration before they were included in the pool of 
subjects.  
The survey consists of three parts, all of which were incorporated in a computer software 
which was developed for this survey.  Parts I and II were paired comparison questions based 
on policy options discussed in the previous section. Part I involved paired comparisons of 
five policy options whereas Part II involved paired comparisons of ten policy options. Part III 
was established to determine respondent’s compensation, and in addition to that it was 
designed to explore the expected utility of the subjects toward risky prospects. 
Prior to laboratory-based survey, respondents received instruction of the survey including 
examples of paired comparison questions during registration and pre-survey presentation. 
The presentation includes also information on the fuel subsidy policy in Indonesia and the 
alternative reallocation schemes. Practice sessions were conducted prior to the survey in 
order to ensure that the subjects understood on how to answer the questions. Respondents 
needing assistance on the use of computer and on the understanding of the instructions might 
request to be aided by 15 ready-helpers. The helpers were students from the Faculty of 
Literature, majoring in Javanese literature, as they were fluent to speak highly Javanese 
language12.  
Respondents were asked to choose the policy option they considered to be more acceptable 
for each paired comparison questions in Parts I and II. The options A and B were shown in a 
box side by side on the computer screen. We set random ordering of pairs for each 
respondent and random positioning of A and B in Part I and II to avoid bias due to 
sequencing of pairs (Chuenpagdee, 1998).  
The standard question for Part I and Part II was: Click on the circle that best represent your 
choice. The circle refers to the one to three scale of acceptability of a policy option. The 
middle circle indicates that both policy options are equally acceptable. The circles to the right 
(left) of the middle circle indicate that option B (A) is more acceptable than option A (B). 
                                                      
12 Since the survey was conducted in Yogyakarta, it is imperative to communicate with the elders with highly 
Javanese language (i.e. kromo), as the language is socially more acceptable and more appropriate to address by 
young people to elder people. Indeed the instruction was in Indonesian language, however, so long as a survey 
has been conducted in some areas in Central Jawa and in East Jawa and the respondents are elder people, it is 
imperative to ask the questions in highly Javanese language.  
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Moving towards the outer right (left) circle indicates that option B (A) is much much much 
more acceptable than option A (B). 
Part III involved 36 paired comparison regarding prospects. Unlike in Parts I and II, the 
choices A and B were not randomly ordered and positioned.  The question in Part III was 
phrased as: Choose between two choices below. There are three circles, the middle indicates 
that both prospects are equally preferable and each of the other two indicates the prospect 
above it is more preferable than the other. Respondents were asked to compare positive 
prospects in the first 9 questions and negative prospects in the subsequent 27 questions. 
Respondents receive an electronic voucher prior to each question regarding negative 
prospect. The results of Part III are not included in this report but can be found in Pradiptyo 
and Sahadewo (2012).   
The survey was conducted in 10 different sessions, each with 40 to 60 respondents and ran 
for about 60-75 minutes. The survey was conducted in the computer laboratory in Faculty of 
Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. Experimenter played 
powerpoint with audio presentation regarding details of the experiment, including 
explanations for each session. The powerpoint and audio presentation also include the 
prologue regarding fuel subsidy, children vaccination, mass rapid transportation, and foreign 
debt. Experimenter offered time for questions and answer before the experiment commence.  
After finishing all three sessions of the experiment, respondents reported to the survey 
assistants to select a random number. The number selected refers to the question regarding 
prospect that the respondent played in Part III only. Respondent’s choice to the randomly 
selected prospect determine the respective prospect that they would be played in a roulette. 
Respondent then played the roulette and claimed their prize accordingly to experimenter in a 
separate room. Respondents who randomly selected a prospect with negative payoff received 
a voucher, indicating they did not owe any money to the experimenter and will be rewarded 
with a souvenir. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of age, gender and income for each group of subjects. The 
average age of the experiment subjects was 38.1 years old, whereby the highest average age 
belong to group 1 or subjects who do not possess motor vehicle at all (42.17 years old) and 
the lowest average age belong to motor cycle group (31.97 years old). Majority of the 
subjects possessed motorcycle only, accounted for 48.06% of the total number of subjects. It 
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should be noted that subjects who possess only 1 car and more than 1 cars have been 
combined since there were not many subjects who posses more than 1 car.  
Table 1. Profile of experiment subjects 
Group Age (average) 
Gender   Income 
Male Female 
Total 
(average)[1] 
N % N % 	  	  
No motor vehicle 42.17 34 36.2 60 63.8 94 Rp677,431 
Motorcycle only 31.97 115 71.4 46 28.6 161 Rp1,835,038 
Car 39.13 54 67.5 26 32.5 80 Rp6,397,491 
Total 38.1 203 60.60% 132 39.40% 335 Rp2,517,399 
Source: Primary data, calculated 
 
Most of the subjects were male, accounting for 60.6% of the total participants. The average 
income for no motor vehicle group was Rp677,431/month (USD75.27)13. The average 
income for motorcycle and car(s) groups were Rp1,835,038/month (USD203.89) and 
Rp6,397,491/month (USD 710.83), respectively. The average income of subjects who 
possess car(s) was almost 10 times than that of subjects with no motor vehicle at all. This 
feature is quite common in developing countries whereby the discrepancy of income between 
middle income and low-income households tend to be wide.  
In term of education characteristics, most of subjects obtained 9-12 years of schooling or 
high-school (41%), followed by those who obtained more than 12 years of schooling or 
higher education (27%). Subjects from no motor vehicle group tend to come from low 
educational background. It should be noted that 51 subjects only obtained 6 years of 
schooling or less and the majority of them were in the no motor vehicle group. Table 2 shows 
that those with lower education level tend to have no vehicle or only motorcycle. On the 
other hand, subjects who went to high school and higher education tend to have car(s).  
 
 
 
                                                      
 
13 Based on exchange rate USD1 = Rp9000.  
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Table 2. Education profile of experiment subjects 
Group 
Education level 
No formal 
education Elementary Junior-high High-school 
Higher 
education 
N % N % N % N % N % 
No motor vehicle 11 11.7 31 33 28 29.8 23 24.5 1 1.1 
Motorcycle only 1 0.6 7 4.3 27 16.8 93 57.8 33 20.5 
Car(s) 0 0 1 1.3 3 3.8 21 26.3 55 68.8 
Total 12 3.6 39 11.6 58 17.3 137 40.9 89 26.6 
Source: primary data, calculated. 
Note: elementary school indicates up to 6 years of schooling; junior high indicates up to 9 years of schooling; 
high school indicates up to 12 years of schooling; diploma and higher indicates more than 12 years of schooling 
 
Table 3 shows the overall result of the experiment in session 1. In session 1 gradual 
elimination and reallocation to earmarked programs was dominant in comparison to the other 
alternative policy options. All groups agreed to give the highest priority to gradual 
elimination and reallocation to MRT and vaccines. In addition, the majority of groups agreed 
to weigh direct elimination with reallocation to earmarked programs as oppose to gradual 
elimination with non-specified programs.  
Table 3. Scale values of policy options in session 1 
Exit Strategy Total 
Household 
Group 1 
Household 
Group 2 
Household 
Group 3 
Household 
Group 4 
Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
Gradually for MRT and vaccines 60.8 1 62 1 53.1 1 57.6 1 74 
Directly for vaccine and various 
government program 50.1 2 53.7 2 48.6 2 48.7 3 49 
Gradually for debt repayment 37.8 3 35.9 4 36.5 4 35.3 4 42.7 
Gradually for various government's 
program 37.7 4 32.2 3 38.8 3 35.7 2 56.3 
Directly for various government's 
program 20.8 5 25.3 5 18.9 5 20.1 5 17.7 
N 335  94  161  56  24 
Kendall u 0.214  0.204  0.233  0.217  0.222 
Observed Chi-square 723.8   199.7   383.1   129.5   61.2 
Source: Primary data, calculated. 
Apart from group 4, the rest of the groups gave direct elimination and reallocation to vaccine 
and various government programs in the second place. This tendency is different to the 
attitude of the subjects who possess more than 1 car tended to choose gradual elimination for 
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the top three alternative, irrespective of how the reallocation of the subsidy would be made.  
This shows that the affluant group tend to be more aware of the impact of the elimination of 
the fuel subsidy to their budget as opposed to the increase in the social welfare function due 
to the reallocation of the subsidy. All groups also agreed to place direct elimination with non-
specified programs in the last place.  
It should be noted that those who posses cars or households with high-income backgrounds 
have enjoyed the subsidy the most. It was estimated about 70% of the subsidy were received 
by 40% of top income households (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2008)14. 
This fact may explain the preference of the subjects in group 4. In contrast to the preference 
of the other groups, the top 2 preference of this group prefer gradual elimination instead of 
direct elimination.  
Subjects in group 4 preferred to weigh the method of elimination heavier rather than the 
reallocation of the subsidy. In contrast, subjects in the other groups determined their 
preference by weighting reallocation of the subsidy heavier rather than the method of 
elimination. This finding provides hard evidence that those who have enjoyed the subsidy the 
most, have a higher status quo bias and endowment effect toward the subsidy as oppose to the 
other groups. The subsidy has been internalized more heavily by subjects in group 4 as part 
of their households income. It may not be surprising, therefore, that for subjects in this group, 
sudden elimination of the subsidy may be perceived as a substantial loss which may rock 
their households budget allocation.   
Table 4 shows the overall result of the 45 pairwise choices in session 2. The result shows that 
subjects, in general, tend to have a general agreement on the first top three and the last three 
choices of their preferences. Gradual elimination tends to be dominant to direct elimination. 
In addition, reallocation of the subsidy to earmarked programs tends to be dominant to 
reallocation to unspecified programs. Consequently, all groups agreed to place direct 
elimination with reallocation to less-observable program (e.g. repayment of overseas debt) 
and unspecified programs on the last two of their preference.  
 
 
                                                      
14 Although the budget plan for the subsidy in 2011 was Rp129.7 trillion or 10% of the GoI annual budget, the 
actual subsidy was Rp160.7 trillion (13.3% of the GoI annual budget). 
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Table 4. Scale values of policy options in session 2 
Exit Strategy Total 
Household 
Group 1 
Household 
Group 2 
Household 
Group 3 
Household 
Group 4 
Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score 
Gradually for vaccine and 
various government program 61 1 59.3 1 60 1 60.9 2 69.4 
Gradually for MRT and 
vaccine 59 2 57.5 2 56.4 2 58.7 1 77.3 
Gradually for MRT and 
various government program 45.3 4 41.8 3 42.9 3 48.4 3 64.8 
Directly for vaccine and 
various government program 41 3 42.4 4 42.2 7 33.1 5 42.6 
Directly for MRT and vaccine 37.7 5 41.4 6 35.7 6 33.5 5 42.6 
Gradually for debt repayment 36.6 6 35 5 36 4 38.3 7 40.3 
Gradually for various 
government's program 35.5 7 30.4 6 35.7 5 36.5 4 48.6 
Directly for MRT and various 
government program 26.5 8 28.2 8 24.3 8 23.8 8 38 
Directly for debt repayment 19.6 9 22.3 9 19.8 9 16.3 10 13 
Directly for various 
government's program 17.9 10 17.8 10 18.8 10 13.9 9 20.4 
N 335  94  161  56  24 
Kendall u 0.27  0.24  0.264  0.35  0.295 
Observed Chi-square 4095.7   1073   1946.3   911.6   350.5 
Source: Primary data, calculated. 
 
The last three options in all groups’ preference were related to direct elimination of the 
subsidy. Subjects in all groups agreed that the first two policy options were gradual 
elimination and reallocation to earmarked programs. Surprisingly, subjects in group 1 placed 
direct elimination with earmarked programs in their third preference, whilst the rest of the 
groups preferred gradual elimination with reallocation to earmarked programs. Subjects in 
group 1 tend to receive the least fuel subsidy as oppose to subjects in the other groups. It may 
not be surprising, therefore, that subjects in group 1 showed the least attachment to the 
subsidy.  As a result, subjects in group 1 have been least affected by status quo bias or 
endowment effect owing to the subsidy.  
The behavior of subjects in groups 1 and 2 was different to those of in groups 3 and 4 with 
respect to their preference up to the top four preferences. Subjects in both groups 3 and 4 did 
not choose any policy options which involve direct elimination. In contrast, subjects in 
groups 1 and 2 may accept to the policy options which content direct elimination of the 
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subsidy.  This occurs since the subjects in groups 1 and 2 weigh more heavily on how the 
reallocation of the subsidy would be done. On the contrary, subjects in groups 3 and 4 more 
concern on the method to eliminate the subsidy. Indeed, it is rational for subjects in groups 1 
and 2 to concern more on the reallocation of the subsidy since, thus far, they have not 
enjoyed the subsidy as much as their counterparts in the other groups. Reallocation of the 
subsidy means that subjects in groups 1 and 2 would enjoy more subsidy than what they have 
received. It is also rational for subjects in groups 3 and 4, however, to focus more on the 
method to eliminate the subsidy since they have enjoyed the subsidy more than the other 
groups.  
In this circumstance, subjects in groups 3 and 4, which were relatively have affluent 
backgrounds, tend to be reluctant to have direct elimination, irrespective of the methods of 
reallocation of the subsidy. Both groups suffered from status quo bias and endowment effect 
more than the other groups. Indeed, the fuel subsidy that has been implementing by the GoI is 
not rational and it has adverse impacts on the social welfare function, however, subjects with 
more affluent backgrounds tended not to take into their consideration into their top four 
preferences. The problem is getting more complicated since the subjects in groups 3 and 4, as 
majority people in Indonesia, may not realize that, thus far, they have enjoyed the fuel 
subsidy.    
The results of Part II, in general, shows that exit strategies with gradual elimination of fuel 
subsidy and reallocation to earmarked programs are valued as the most acceptable. In total, 
respondents were consistent between Part I and II regarding the ordering of the policy 
options. The close correspondence of the scale values among different groups is also evident 
for the ten policy options in Part II. The null hypothesis that there was no agreement among 
the respondents in each group was rejected in all cases.  
The close correspondence of the scale values for the policy options in Part II among different 
household groups is shown by the high correlation coefficients in Table 5. Note that the 
correspondence between households of group 1 and 4 is relatively lower. The results however 
illustrate that paired comparisons method yield consistent judgments that reflect the apparent 
wide sharing of norms as Chuenpagdee et al. (2001) suggested. 
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Table 5. Gamma coefficient correlation of policy options 
 
Household 
Group 1 
Household 
Group 2 
Household 
Group 3 
Household 
Group 4 
Household Group 1 1 0.87 0.73 0.73 
Household Group 2 - 1 0.87 0.78 
Household Group 3 - - 1 0.78 
Household Group 4 - - - 1 
Source: Primary data, calculated. 
The results in Part I and Part II show that respondents valuation of losses is greater for direct 
elimination subsidy than the equivalent gradual elimination. Respondents chose “to pay” later 
and at a smaller amount rather than to pay immediately of the same total amount. The 
evidences also suggest that respondents preferred reallocation to earmarked programs such as 
children vaccination and MRT. Here, respondents valued earmarked programs more 
acceptable as they belief that they will receive compensation with higher certainty. In 
particular, respondents considered children vaccination more acceptable as it offers a more 
immediate compensation. Other noteworthy finding is the tendency for households of group 3 
and 4 to choose gradual elimination scheme. This result is an indication that the higher the 
consumption of subsidized fuel by households, the higher the impact of the policy to the 
reduction in the households’ income.  
Summarizing, each group was able to present relatively consistent preference regarding the 
most acceptable policy option. The scale values provide hard evidences and practical guide to 
formulate the appropriate exit strategy from the fuel subsidy. For example, policymakers 
should be motivated to formulate policy to accommodate gradual elimination as the results 
reflects people’s valuations of losses owing to removal of subsidy. Policymakers may also 
use the results for justification regarding reallocation of subsidy to earmarked programs. 
These valuations are useful to promote efficient allocations of resources of social objectives.  
5.	  CONCLUSION	  
People’s valuations of losses owing to elimination of fuel subsidy would be a difficult task to 
perform. Scale of relative importance derived from a paired comparison survey provide a 
consistent community judgments of the most acceptable exit strategy on the elimination of 
fuel subsidy. The scale shows that exit strategy that includes gradual elimination of fuel 
subsidy and reallocation to earmarked programs were perceived to be the most acceptable.  
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This scale can be utilized by the government to establish the appropriate policy responses 
regarding elimination of fuel subsidy that would promote a more efficient allocation of 
resources. This scale provides a more practical solution to accommodate the complexity of 
decision to eliminate the fuel subsidy. At the end, establishment of scale of relative 
importance derived from community judgments can be applied to various problems that 
requires complex decision making. Example of such decision making include elimination of 
electricity subsidy, elicitation of the most appropriate poverty alleviation program, and many 
more.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Subsidy Expenditure 
Table 1: Subsidy Expenditure in Indonesia, 2005-2012 
Subsidy Expenditure  
(trillion Rp) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Energy         
 Fuel subsidy (A) 95.6 64.2 83.8 139.1 45 82.4 129.7 123.6 
 Electricity 8.9 30.4 33.1 83.9 49.5 57.6 65.6 45 
Total Energy (1) 104.5 94.6 116.9 223 94.5 140 195.3 168.6 
Non-energy         
 Food 6.4 5.3 6.6 12.1 13 15.2 15.3 15.6 
 Fertilizer 2.5 3.2 6.3 15.2 18.3 18.4 18.8 16.9 
 Plant seed 0.1 0.1 0.5 1 1.6 2.2 0.1 0.3 
 Public Service Obligation 0.9 1.8 1 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.8 2 
 Credit assistance 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.9 1.2 
 Tax subsidy 6.2 1.9 17.1 21 8.2 14.8 4 4.2 
 Other subsidy 0 0.3 1.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 
Total Non-Energy (2) 16.2 12.9 33.3 52.2 43.5 52.8 41.9 40.2 
Total Subsidy Expenditure 
(3=1+2) 120.7 107.5 150.2 275.2 138 192.8 237.2 208.8 
Total Government Budget (4) 361.2 440 504.6 693.4 628.8 697.4 908.2 954.1 
Proportion of Fuel Subsidy/Total 
Subsidy (=A/3) 79.20% 59.70% 55.80% 50.50% 32.60% 42.70% 54.70% 59.20% 
Proportion of Energy 
Subsidy/Total Budget (1/4) 28.90% 21.50% 23.20% 32.20% 15.00% 20.10% 21.50% 17.70% 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2008; 2012) and Pradiptyo and Sahadewo (2012) 
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Appendix 2. The Schemes of policy option 
  
  
Straight Elimination or Gradual Elimination 
 
Reallocation of subsidy to other government programs  
 
S 
Reallocation of subsidy 
to fund vaccination for 
all children 
Reallocation of subsidy to 
fund vaccination for all 
children and various 
government programs  
 
Reallocation of 
subsidy to fund 
vaccination for all 
children 
 
Reallocation of subsidy to 
fund development of 
mass rapid transportation 
and other government 
programs 
  
 
Reallocation of 
subsidy to fund 
vaccination for all 
children 
Reallocation of subsidy to 
repay debt and its interest 
and other government 
programs 
  
Reallocation of 
subsidy to repay 
foreign debt and its 
interest 
 
Reallocation of 
subsidy to fund 
development of mass 
rapid transportation 
  
Reallocation of subsidy to fund 
vaccination for all children and 
development of mass rapid 
transportation 
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Appendix 3: Sampling procedures  
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EXPERIMENT	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  SUBJECT	  PICKED	  
RANDOM	  NUMBER	  FOR	  
RENUMERATION
PLAY	  ROULLETTEEACH	  SUBJECT	  CLAIMED	  THEIR	  PRIZE
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Appendix 4: Registration  form and experiment guide 
INFORMED CONSENT 
The P2EB (Center of Economic and Business Research and Training) of the Faculty of 
Economics and Business of Gadjah Mada University is conducting an experiment in relation to a 
research on the appropriate strategy  for the Government to lift fuel subsidy in Indonesia. This page 
briefly explains the experiment participant’s rights in order to help you decide your participation. If 
you agree to participate, you will not suffer any financial loss of whatsoever throughout the 
experiment. 
  In this experiment you will be requested to select a number of options of your preference. All 
information you provide during the experiment process will be kept confidential and will not by any 
means related to your name. If during the experiment process you do not feel comfortable, for 
whatever reason, you can leave the laboratory where the experiment is conducted and the information 
that you have provided will not be recorded. Your participation in this study requires approximately 
60 minutes.  When this study is completed, you are free to ask any inquiry related to the questions we 
have asked. If you have any further enquiries about this research, feel free to contact us via our email 
address: experiment.ugm@gmail.com 
 Your participation is on voluntary basis. All information will be kept confidential and your 
name will not be related to the research finding. The research results will be published without 
mentioning your name. This research is not related with your profession or occupation. 
 The sampling method taken for this research is done by collecting a number of samples, and 
then there will be a random lottery to determine the experiment participants. If you are selected to be 
one, you will be contacted by phone. If you are not selected, you will still be contacted by phone too. 
Please sign the column below to acknowledge that you have understood the information that we 
provide on this sheet and that you give approval to participate in our experiment. 
Noted by      Approved by 
Yogyakarta, 2012-03-01    Yogyakarta, 2012-03-01 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------    ----------------------------------------------- 
Research Tim Member     (Printed Name:                                    ) 
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EXPERIMENT PARTICIPANT REGISTRATION FORM 
In the Inquiry of the Most Acceptable Strategy for Lifting Fuel Subsidy Scheme in Indonesia: 
an Experimental Approach 
          CODE: 
 
Please fill in the blanks in capital letters 
Complete Name: ………………………………………………………………………….. 
Sex*  : Male/Female 
Address  : ………………………………………………………………………….. 
  ………………………………………………………………………….. 
  ………………………………………………………………………….. 
Mobile Phone Number: ………………………………………………………………………….. 
Are you the main breadwinner in your family? * Yes/No 
Indicate your motor-vehicle ownership (you can choose more than one): 
               None 
               Motorcycle:   Quantity : …….  unit(s)  
               Car      :  Quantity : …….  unit(s) 
 
 
Yogyakarta, …………………. 2012 
 
 
 
           
(………………………………………)        
 Printed Name 
 
*Cross which is not applicable 
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EXPERIMENT GUIDES 
 Thank you for participating in this experiment. It is about a decision-making process. 
You are expected to follow the instructions which will guide you throughout the experiment. 
You have the chance to win a certain amount of money at the end of the experiment if you 
follow the experiment guides carefully and make the right decision. You can receive the 
money you will win in this experiment in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 Before the session for the explanation of the experiment guides starts, fill in your 
personal data in the section below. The information you provide for us will be kept 
confidential and will be used only for the purpose of this research. Do not hesitate to ask our 
help if you are not used to working on the computer. 
A. GENERAL INSTRUCTION 
This experiment consists of three sessions. In the first session, you will find 10 pairs 
of options on the fuel subsidy scheme.  For every option pair, you are to choose one of the 
two fuel subsidy schemes which you think is the most acceptable. In the second session, you 
will find 45 option pairs on the fuel subsidy scheme. As in the previous session, for every 
option pair you are to choose one of the two fuel subsidy schemes which you think is the 
most suitable. In the third session, you will find 32 option pairs. You are to choose what you 
think is best for every option pair. 
In the final section of the experiment, you are to randomly select anyone of the 32 
option pairs which you have taken in the third session. Your selection will determine the 
money you will win, which will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The maximum 
amount you can win in this experiment is Rp 205,000.- 
B. PROLOGUE 
The Indonesian Government has provided fuel subsidy, particularly for Premium, 
since the 1970’s. The amount of the subsidy paid by the Government for each liter of 
Premium is the difference between the price set by the Government and the real market 
economic price, which results in a lower price for consumers.  For example, the price of a 
liter of Premium is Rp 4,500.- while that of the non-subsidized gasoline (Pertamax) is Rp 
8,800.- Consumers just pay Rp 4,500.- and the difference, which is Rp 4,300.- , is subsidized 
by the Government. 
The motor-vehicle operational cost has been lowered by the fuel subsidy so that the 
motor-vehicle sale and the fuel consumption have been increasing. On the other hand, the 
increase of the subsidized fuel consumption has increased the government’s subsidy 
spending. The fuel subsidy in 2011 reached Rp 160 trillion or 5.8% of the government’s total 
spending. The fuel subsidy rose sharply at 61% to Rp 95 trillion in 2011. In the near future, 
the Government plans to lift the fuel subsidy. The non-subsidized Pertamax will replace the 
Premium gasoline after the Government lifts the fuel subsidy.  
 The Indonesian Government, through the National Immunization Program, has freely 
provided five types of vaccines for children below five.  The five vaccines include those 
against tuberculosis, tetanus, polio, measles and hepatitis B. This number has not met the 
World Health Organization’s recommendation, which requires children to receive ten types 
of vaccines. The Indonesian Government has not been able to freely provide the other types 
of vaccines, which include MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella), chicken pox, meningitis, 
and pneumonia, influenza, and hepatitis A. 
 The Indonesian Government is currently planning the infrastructure construction, 
particularly the mass transport system in several big cities in Indonesia. The plan includes the 
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mass transport construction in the Jabodetabek (Jakarta-Bogor-Depok-Tangerang-Bekasi), 
the Gerbang Kertasusila (Gresik-Bangkalan-Mojokerto-Surabaya-Sidoarjo-Lamongan), the 
Mebidangro (Medan-Binjai-Deli Serdang-Karo), the Maminasata (Makassar-Maros-Gowa-
Takalar, the Sarbagita (Denpasar-Badung-Gianyar-Tabanan) and the Greater Bandung 
(Bandung-Cimahi-Sumedang) areas. 
 The Indonesian Government’s foreign debts up to June 2011 reached Rp 588.5 trillion 
and the foreign-debt capital installment for last year amounted to Rp 47.2 trillion. The 
Government’s debt interest payment in 2011 reached Rp 106.5 trillion.  
 
C. SESSION ONE   
 You will find 10 pairs of options on the fuel subsidy scheme. Every pair has two 
answer options, namely A and B, and each provides different information. Choose the 
subsidy scheme you deem more acceptable and select the number representing your choice. 
Click the number “0” if you think both are acceptable. Click the numbers “1”, “2”, and “3” if 
Option A is more acceptable than Option B, the higher the number the more acceptable A is. 
On the contrary, click the numbers “I”, “II”, and “III” if Option B is more acceptable than 
Option A. When you have been sure of your answer, click “RECORD YOUR ANSWER”. 
Figure I: A Pair of a Sample Question in Session I 
 
The price of subsidized fuel 
(Premium)is going to be increased by 
Rp750 for every 6 months until it is 
equal to the price of non-subsidized fuel 
(Pertamax) in three years. The total 
amount of the fuel subsidy saved is 
going to be allocated directlyto other 
government programs for the next three 
years. 
The fuel subsidy is going to be eliminated and 
everybody is going to pay non-subsidized 
fuel(Pertamax) price. Currently, due to limited 
budget, the government cannot afford to provide 
free vaccines for the prevention of the following 
diseases: meningitis, typhoid, mumps, measles 
and rubella. The total amount of the fuel subsidy 
saved is going to be allocated directly to make 
the vaccines for the diseases attainable for free 
only to children who come from low income 
A B 
A is more 
acceptable 
than B 
RECORD THE ANSWER 
Please click the circle which you believe to be the most appropriate 
1 2 3 0 I II III 
A is as 
acceptable 
as B 
B is more 
acceptable 
than A 
SESSION I 
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You will find the following question after you have selected your answer. 
ARE YOU SURE OF YOUR ANSWER 
YES NO 
Click “NO” if you are not sure of your answer and you want to change yet. 
Click “YES” if you are sure of your answer. The computer will store your answer and you 
cannot change it any longer.  
D. SESSION TWO 
 You will find 45 pairs of options on the fuel subsidy scheme. Every pair has two 
answer options, namely A and B, and each provides different information. Choose the 
subsidy scheme you deem more acceptable and select the number representing your choice. 
Click the number “0” if you think both are acceptable. Click the numbers “1”, “2”, and “3” if 
Option A is more acceptable than Option B, the higher the number the more acceptable A is. 
On the contrary, click the numbers “I”, “II”, and “III” if Option B is more acceptable than 
Option A. When you have been sure of your answer, click “RECORD YOUR ANSWER”. 
Figure 2: A Pair of a Sample Question in Session 2 
 
You will find the following question after you have selected your answer. 
ARE YOU SURE OF YOUR ANSWER 
YES NO 
The price of subsidized fuel 
(Premium)is going to be increased by 
Rp750every 6 months until it is equal 
to the price of non-subsidized fuel 
(Pertamax) in three years. 
The price of subsidized fuel (Premium) is 
going to be increased by Rp750 for every 
6 months until it is equal to the price of 
non-subsidized fuel (Pertamax) in three 
years. The total amount of the fuel 
subsidy saved is going to be allocated to 
fund investment in necessary 
transportation infrastructure for the next 
three years. 
A B 
A is more 
acceptable 
than B 
RECORD THE ANSWER 
Please click the circle which you believe to be the most appropriate 
1 2 3 0 I II III 
A is as 
acceptable 
as B 
B is more 
acceptable 
than A 
SESSION II 
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Click “NO” if you are not sure of your answer and you want to change yet.Click “YES” if 
you are sure of your answer. The computer will store your answer and you cannot change it 
any longer.  
E. SESSION THREE 
 You will find 32 option pairs. The options in this session are not related with your 
answers in the previous two sessions. For every question, select the one you consider the 
better of the two options. You have the chance to win a certain amount of money when you 
play the game without risking any loss. 
1. SECTION ONE: Questions 1-8 
Option A offers a fixed amount of money while Option B offers two numbers with their 
respective chances. Click “SELECT A” if Option A is better than Option B. On the contrary, 
click “SELECT B” if Option B is better than Option A. If you think that Option A and B are 
equally good, click “A & B ARE EQUAL”. When you have been sure of your answer, click 
“RECORD YOUR ANSWER”. The computer will store your answer when you click 
“RECORD YOUR ANSWER” and you cannot change it any longer.  
Figure 3: A Pair of a Sample Question in Section 3 
 
2. SECTION TWO:  Questions 9 – 16 
You will receive a voucher for every question from Number 9 to Number 16. The nominal 
value of your voucher varies from question to question. 
In Questions 9 to 16, the question model is similar to that in Questions 1 to 8. Option A offers 
a fixed amount of money while Option B offers two numbers with their respective chances. 
Click “OPTION A” if you think that Option A is better than Option B. Conversely, click 
“OPTION B” if you think that Option B is better than Option A. If you think that Option A 
 
Prospect A 
RECORD THE ANSWER 
Please choose between the two prospects 
Rp70,000 with certainty 
CHOOSE A CHOOSE B INDIFFERENT 
 
Rp100,000 with probability 80% 
Rp0 with probability 20% 
Prospect B 
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and Option B are equally good, click “A & B ARE EQUAL”. When you have been sure 
about your answer, click “RECORD YOUR ANSWER”. The computer will store your 
answer after you click “RECORD YOUR ANSWER” and you cannot change it any longer. 
3. SECTION THREE: Questions 17-24  
You will receive a voucher for every question from Number 17 to Number 24. The nominal 
value of your voucher is the same for every question, namely Rp 125,000 for each. 
In Questions 17 to 24, the question model is similar to that in Questions 1 to 8. Option A 
offers a fixed amount of money while Option B offers two numbers with their respective 
chances. Click “OPTION A” if you think that Option A is better than Option B. Conversely, 
click “OPTION B” if you think that Option B is better than Option A. If you think that 
Option A and Option B are equally good, click “A & B ARE EQUAL”. When you have been 
sure of your answer, click “RECORD YOUR ANSWER”. The computer will store your 
answer after you click “RECORD YOUR ANSWER” and you cannot change it any longer. 
4. SECTION FOUR: Questions 25-32  
You will receive a voucher and a souvenir for every question from Number 25 to Number 32. 
In Questions 25 to 32, the question model is similar to that in Questions 1 to 8. Option A 
offers a fixed amount of money while Option B offers two numbers with their respective 
chances. Click “OPTION A” if you think that Option A is better than Option B. Conversely, 
click “OPTION B” if you think that Option B is better than Option A. If you think that 
Option A and Option B are equally good, click “A & B ARE EQUAL”. When you have been 
sure of your answer, click “RECORD YOUR ANSWER”. The computer will store your 
answer after you click “RECORD YOUR ANSWER” and you cannot change it any longer. 
 
F.  METHOD OF PAYMENT 
At the end of the third session, you randomly choose the questions that you have answered in 
the third session in order to determine the amount of money you can win. 
For example, if you get the number 2, the money will depend on your selection in “Question 
2”. For instance, if you select A for “Question 2”, you will win Rp 70,000. The amount of 
money you will win is Rp 70,000. 
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If you select Option B in “Question 2”, you will play “The Wheel of Fortune” to determine 
the money you will win. If the arrow of the Wheel of Fortune aims at the area of “Rp 
100,000”, you will win Rp 100,000. If it aims at the area of “Rp 0”, you will receive no 
additional money from this session. 
 
If you select “A & B ARE EQUAL” for “Question 2”, you will toss a coin to determine 
whether you will money from Option A or Option B. If the coin you toss shows the “HEAD”, 
you will win an additional sum of money in accordance with what is written in Option A. On 
the contrary, you will play the wheel of fortune if the coin you toss shows the “TAIL” to 
determine the amount of money which you win in Option B.  
 
 
 
Prospect A 
Prospect 16, Session 2 
You chose 
Rp70,000 with certainty 
Prospect B 
Prospect 16, Session 2 
You chose 
 Rp0 
Rp100,000 
Rp100,000 with probability 80% 
Rp0 with probability 20% 
 
